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ABSTRACT 
The article proposes a model for rapidly re-establishing a functioning 
justice system in societies shattered by crisis. The front-line justice 
system is based on the quick deployment of “justice shelters” in 
communities, in which trained local jurists give legal information and 
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advice, and local judges issue emergency safeguard orders and mediate 
disputes between parties. The mandate of the justice shelters is broad, and 
comprises civil, family, and administrative as well as criminal matters. 
The shelters are designed to rebuild confidence in the administration of 
justice by addressing all the justice needs of the local population, rather 
than limiting themselves to criminal matters or transitional justice issues. 
As such, the front-line justice system builds on other initiatives, 
particularly those growing out of the United Nations Brahimi Report, and 
offers a way to address emergency justice issues, but also to move 
forward towards the re-establishment of working and accepted permanent 
institutions of justice. 
INTRODUCTION 
Where do we begin rebuilding societies that are so utterly shattered 
that virtually nothing of civil society remains? How can lofty ideals like 
the rule of law, democracy, accountability, reconciliation, and justice be 
realized when hunger, disease, and indiscriminate killing make even daily 
survival difficult? How, in short, can we bring justice concerns to the 
front lines where the need is most acute, but the danger most intense? 
The crises brought on by warfare, ethnic conflict, political instability, 
or natural disasters play themselves out in a number of different registers 
simultaneously. Television images of horrific humanitarian disasters—
famine, disease, mass killings, displaced populations—are but the most 
visible effects of conditions that also have strong political, cultural, legal, 
and economic repercussions. The situation at the front lines presents 
particularly serious problems at the level of justice, ranging from a 
populace locked in cycles of anger, distrust, recrimination, and 
hopelessness, to officials unwilling or unable to act, to severe shortages 
of resources and personnel. Because of these particular challenges, justice 
at the front lines requires thinking in new ways about the nature of justice 
institutions, their role in societies in transition, and how they can, or 
should, be rebuilt. 
If we begin at the symbolic level, it is useful to put aside the image of 
justice as a majestic citadel, imposing and forbidding, grounded in the 
past but promising the future, and replace it temporarily with a humble 
shelter—the gathering place for a local community and very much rooted 
in the present. If the citadel of justice represents the Western ideal of the 
rule of law, a goal to be worked towards in the long term, the justice 





shelter represents the immediate practical reality of justice in a society in 
crisis, a working expedient as a first step toward grander ambitions. 
This image of the justice shelter is central to the front-line justice 
system presented here. While its scale is far more modest than the citadel, 
to be sure, it is a symbol defined by two more important characteristics. 
First, it represents local justice, which brings together local communities 
to seek and dispense justice through participation in and acceptance of the 
front-line justice system.1 Second, its timeframe is the present, with 
justice as participatory, immediate, and available, rather than 
retrospective or forward-looking to an idealistic future. In short, the 
justice shelter represents present justice as lived by its community: justice 
as tactile, engaged, and local. The justice shelter underscores the 
importance in the immediate post-crisis period of dealing with the present 
by means of community, of providing a way to address the urgent legal 
problems affecting the lives of the populace, which arise both from the 
crisis itself as well as from the ordinary course of people’s lives. 
The front-line justice system we propose is a rapidly deployable core 
of essential legal dispute-resolution mechanisms designed to restore a 
working framework of legality in societies where there is nothing else. Its 
point of departure is the recognition that, although periods of crisis create 
extraordinary problems for the society that has endured them, individuals 
and communities continue to experience their own no less urgent 
problems at the same time. A post-crisis justice intervention must, 
therefore, address both the extraordinary and the ordinary; a return to 
normalcy requires no less. 
To this end, we propose setting up within stricken societies an 
emergency hybrid justice system (“front-line justice”) comprising three 
wings: informational justice, safeguard justice, and mediational justice. 
The function of the front-line justice system is to create as rapidly as 
possible an institution to assess and administer the immediate emergency 
justice needs of the local population—in short, to triage the situation and 
to provide trained and capable personnel to deal with problems as they 
are revealed. In the informational justice area, local jurists will be 
available to evaluate citizens’ legal problems: the jurists will themselves 
deal with simpler matters of legal information or advice, while referring 
more complex matters to other personnel in the justice shelter. The 
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safeguard justice area will comprise judges empowered to issue safeguard 
orders, such as injunctions, in urgent cases to protect the rights and 
persons of citizens. The mediational justice area will offer trained 
mediators drawn from the local population to resolve citizens’ disputes in 
a voluntary and participatory process that will tap and encourage the 
conflict-resolution capacity of the local community. In all three areas, 
international experts (judges, jurists, legal academics) will be present to 
serve as resource personnel and to help train local justice officials—but 
the system itself is to be locally run. 
The front-line justice system thus provides an immediate means of 
protecting the population and preventing abuses of power and other forms 
of self-help during the period of turmoil, when institutions are paralyzed 
and can no longer play their role as guardians of legality. In the long 
term, however, the front-line justice system—particularly its 
informational justice and mediational justice wings—will serve as the 
bridge between the emergency rebuilding phase of the initiative and 
permanent institutions of justice. Though front-line justice is an 
emergency justice system, it is built on the belief that healing and 
empowerment are community goals to be achieved by community 
initiatives. 
In what follows we will present the front-line justice system and situate 
it within the existing literature on post-conflict reconstruction. In Part I, 
we will examine why a flexible, mediation-oriented model of 
reconstructive justice is needed. We will survey some of the other 
proposals along these lines, in particular the recommendations of the 
United Nations Brahimi Report of 20002 and the growing literature on 
“justice packages” that it inspired. We will argue that such interventions 
need to be conceived more broadly than the limits of the concept of 
transitional justice allow. In Part II, we will present our model of the 
front-line justice system, outlining its main features and showing how it 
fits into a more broadly based reconstruction initiative. In particular, we 
will argue that a mediation-based system addresses the needs for 
flexibility and acceptability essential to the success of a post-crisis justice 
initiative. Part III will discuss several issues and concerns regarding 
reconstructive justice, such as the goals envisaged for the intervention, 
justice concerns, and cultural concerns. These issues present particular 
challenges in the design and implementation of a post-crisis justice 
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system, and how they are resolved can have a decisive influence on 
whether the initiative succeeds or fails in the long term. 
 
I. CONCEPTUALIZING POST-CRISIS JUSTICE INTERVENTIONS 
Time is of the essence in post-crisis intervention, since delays and 
indecisiveness allow problems to worsen and spread. This is true of all 
aspects of a situation: even in the realm of justice rebuilding, which on its 
surface would appear to be less time sensitive than issues of survival or 
security, delays can mean that abuses and injustices become ingrained, 
and failure to act can allow complacency and despair to take root. Poorly 
planned or heavy-handed intervention can sometimes be worse than none 
at all, however, since it can solidify resistance by giving obstructionist 
elements within the society a clear target for their hostility. A justice 
initiative, therefore, must balance rapid response with careful and 
thoughtful planning. It is crucial that any intervention be conceptualized 
as to what it can and cannot achieve, as to how it will fit into the existing 
society, and as to how it will contribute to fundamentally reshaping that 
society. 
The humanitarian, cultural, and political crises at the end of the 
twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first have spawned a great 
deal of research into how international interventions can help rebuild 
shattered legal systems and restore (or implement) the rule of law, so as 
to begin a process of sustainable peace-building. A wide variety of terms 
has been used to describe these interventions, including transitional 
justice,3 post-conflict reconstruction,4 post-conflict governance,5 
 
3. RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000); Miriam J. Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, 
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28 MANITOBA L.J. 113 (2000). 
4. This term is particularly associated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
See Center for Strategic and International Studies & Association of the United States Army, Post-
Conflict Reconstruction: Task Framework (2002), available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/ 
pubs/framework.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2007) [hereinafter CSIS, Task Framework]; see also Scott 
Feil, Building Better Foundations: Security in Postconflict Reconstruction, 25 WASH. Q. 97 (2002); 
John J. Hamre & Gordon R. Sullivan, Toward Postconflict Reconstruction, 25 WASH. Q. 85 (2002); 
Jacob S. Kreilkamp, Note, U.N. Postconflict Reconstruction, 35 N.Y.U.J. INT’L L. & POL. 619 
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reconstructive justice,6 reconciliation,7 jus post bellum,8 transformative 
justice,9 and post-conflict peace-building.10 These terms are not 
interchangeable, as each has different nuances and emphases, but taken 
together they describe a cluster of related concepts that apply to 
(re)establishing justice and the rule of law in the wake of unrest, whether 
its causes be political, social, military, or natural in origin. 
In what follows, we survey some of these proposals for emergency 
legal intervention in the immediate post-crisis period and assess their 
strengths, as well as some of their conceptual shortcomings. This will 
serve as background to help situate the front-line justice system that we 
introduce in the next part. 
A. United Nations Proposals 
Of prime importance as a spur to further work in this area is the 2000 
report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, chaired by 
Lakhdar Brahimi, which has generated a great deal of commentary.11 The 
Brahimi Report undertook a review of the procedures and goals of U.N. 
peace operations in the wake of experiences in Kosovo and East Timor. 
Among the issues the report recognized was the problem of determining 
and applying the applicable law in the short term by transitional civil 
administrations, especially where local justice capacity was severely 
diminished or non-existent. To this end, the panel recommended the 
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7. See generally JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE: SUSTAINABLE RECONCILIATION IN 
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9. Daly, supra note 7. 
10. Ivan Simonovic, Post-Conflict Peace Building: The New Trends, 31 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 
251 (2003); Wendy Lambourne, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Meeting Human Needs for Justice and 
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(last visited Feb. 15, 2007). 
11. Chairman of the Panel, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, delivered 
to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/2000/809, A/55/305 (Aug. 21, 
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adoption of “interim legal codes” or “justice packages” containing the 
essentials of substantive criminal law and procedure, which international 
interveners could apply immediately, thereby avoiding the long start-up 
delays associated with learning a foreign legal system.12 Such codes 
would contain “the basics of both law and procedure to enable an 
operation to apply due process using international jurists and 
internationally agreed standards in the case of such crimes as murder, 
rape, arson, kidnapping, and aggravated assault.” Property law was 
explicitly excluded, though the codes would cover crimes against 
property.13 
Several months later, however, a study commissioned by the U.N. 
Secretary-General expressed doubts about the feasibility of creating a 
single code that could apply prospectively to all interventions given the 
significant differences in substantive criminal law in different countries. 
The Secretary-General’s report instead recommended concentrating on a 
model code of criminal procedure, while taking into account international 
instruments regarding human rights, torture, and children’s rights.14 More 
recently, and along the same lines, at the end of 2003 the United Nations 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations issued its Handbook on United 
Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, which questioned 
whether any law brought and, in essence, imposed by foreign interveners 
could ever function effectively: 
The question of which law to apply is essentially a political issue 
that cannot be resolved by a peacekeeping mission. Agreement 
among the parties as to the applicable law is an important first step 
in judicial and rule of law reform…. The emergent legal code 
should be recognized and seen to be legitimate by the local 
population or it will not be sustainable and the local judiciary may 
not be able to enforce it.15 
 
12. Id. ¶¶ 79–82. 
13. Id. ¶ 82. 
14. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the 
Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, ¶¶ 31–32, delivered to the General 
Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/2000/1081, A/55/502 (Oct. 20, 2000), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/ 
doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/741/43/PDF/N0074143.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2007). 
15. U.N. Dep’t of Peacekeeping Operations, Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional 
Peacekeeping Operations, 97 (Dec. 2003), available at http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/library/ 
Handbook%20on%20UN%20PKOs.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2007) [hereinafter Peacekeeping 
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These twin problems of substantive content and local acceptability 
continue to be an important focus of research into the resolution of justice 
problems during post-crisis reconstruction. 
The most recent contribution by the U.N. defining the terms of post-
conflict justice rebuilding is the Secretary-General’s August 2004 report 
on transitional justice and the rule of law, which emphasizes the need for 
dynamic linkage between short-term interventions and long-term justice-
rebuilding projects.16 In particular, the report moves beyond the 
preliminary groundwork laid by the Brahimi Report to stress the 
fundamental importance of cooperation with local elements in any peace-
building intervention, rather than the simple imposition of an 
international model and abstract ideals. Though its emphasis is on 
transitional justice issues (criminal accountability, truth telling, vetting 
the public service, reparations) as a foundation for fostering the rule of 
law in the long term, the report makes two key suggestions that move 
debate forward in important ways. First, it acknowledges the importance 
of creating a strategy capable of dealing not just with criminal matters, 
but also with civil, administrative, and other problems.17 Second, it looks 
beyond adjudication as the universal model of dispute resolution, arguing 
that “indigenous and informal traditions for administering justice or 
settling disputes” should be fostered and used.18 These are important 
contributions to the debate, which the present front-line justice system 
takes up and carries still further. 
B. Other Proposals 
Various scholars have picked up on these U.N. reports and have 
proposed more concrete strategies for justice rebuilding.19 All agree that it 
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19. See, e.g., Hansjoerg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The 
United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT’L. L. 46 (2001) [hereinafter 
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is essential to address justice issues head-on, and not to treat them simply 
as the by-product of security or democracy interventions. The rule of law 
does not automatically reappear once a crisis ends and a sufficient degree 
of security is achieved; any intervention must take positive and concrete 
action both to remedy existing problems and to lay foundations for future 
growth. 
Hansjoerg Strohmeyer, in assessing the lessons learned from the U.N. 
missions in Kosovo and East Timor, has argued that immediate attention 
to justice issues is so crucial that “the quick deployment of units of 
military lawyers…can fill the vacuum until the United Nations is staffed 
and able to take over what is ultimately a civilian responsibility.”20 To 
minimize this phase, since its military nature—however necessary it may 
be—limits its palatability, Strohmeyer recommends the drafting of a U.N. 
“quick-start package” containing the essentials of substantive criminal 
law and criminal procedure.21 Finally, in considering the lessons from 
East Timor, Strohmeyer notes that: 
Alternative methods and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms 
are indispensable. On the other hand, traditional or alternative 
forms of dispute settlement should not simply become a means of 
covering up for a lack of access to the ordinary justice system. To 
this end, UNTAET [United Nations Transitional Administration in 
East Timor] must further explore the use of mobile courts, regular 
out-of-court days, and the establishment of “justices of the peace” 
in remote communities.22 
Strohmeyer’s proposal, based as it is on the empirical experience of 
particular missions, underscores the urgency of short-term intervention 
and the need for creative solutions to the problem of stabilizing a 
situation as quickly as possible. What weakens his proposal, however, is 
its almost exclusive emphasis on criminal matters and on stabilizing and 
securing the situation, which brings into question how useful this 
proposal will be as a foundation for moving forward. The same concern 
applies to many of the other proposals for justice interventions as well. 
 
“CHALLENGES OF PEACE OPERATIONS” PROJECT CONFERENCE 115 (Jessica Howard & Bruce 
Oswald eds., 2002), available at http://www.apcml.org/RuleofLawbookfinal.pdf (last visited Feb. 
15, 2007); Michael J. Matheson, United Nations Governance of Postconflict Societies, 95 AM. J. 
INT’L. L. 76 (2002). 
20. Strohmeyer, Collapse, supra note 19, at 61. 
21. Id. at 62–63; cf. Strohmeyer, Policing the Peace, supra note 4, at 181. 
22. Strohmeyer, Policing the Peace, supra note 4, at 179–80. 




Mark Plunkett has made important contributions to the role that outside 
intervention, and “justice packages” in particular, might play in 
rebuilding the rule of law in post-crisis societies. Rebuilding, for 
Plunkett, begins with “the delivery of specific designer-planned and 
implemented peace operation justice packages using the two combined 
techniques of (a) an enforcement model…; and (b) a negotiation 
model.”23 Plunkett’s enforcement model aims at the immediate restoration 
of a measure of security and stability by quickly implementing a criminal 
justice system. His negotiation model looks ahead by initiating 
consultation with local elements for the purpose of inculcating values of 
justice and accountability.24 In contrast to the direction the U.N. has been 
moving in recently, Plunkett’s justice packages are “off-the-shelf” model 
codes of criminal law and procedure.25 Off-the-shelf need not mean one-
size-fits-all, however. It is essential that these packages be tailored to the 
specific context of the society emerging from crisis: 
Each package has to be individually designed to meet the criminal 
justice needs of a particular people, such as to win their 
confidence…. A justice package incorporates the generic nuts and 
bolts of law and order restoration, as well as local social and 
cultural dynamics for its acceptance by the population.26 
This cultural sensitivity is crucial to the success of the intervention; as 
Plunkett notes, “[t]he aim of a justice package is to create a social 
compact, whereby the people of the country recently in conflict 
voluntarily agree to a system of law and order. A successful justice 
package brings about their cooperation.”27 
Similarly, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and 
its affiliated scholars have also studied the implementation of interim 
justice systems in post-crisis societies. Chief among their 
recommendations is the need for integrated post-crisis interventions, 
rather than a piecemeal approach: “Post-conflict reconstruction requires 
integrated security and social, economic, and political development 
 
23. Mark Plunkett, Rebuilding the Rule of Law, in FROM CIVIL STRIFE TO CIVIL SOCIETY: 
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24. Id. at 213–24. 
25. Id. at 215. 
26. Mark Plunkett, Reestablishing Law and Order in Peace-Maintenance, in THE POLITICS OF 
PEACE-MAINTENANCE 61, 68 (Jarat Chopra ed., 1998). 
27. Id. 





efforts, not separate tracks that do not converge.”28 As in Plunkett’s 
proposals, local input is crucial, and “indigenous actors should have the 
primary responsibility and should play central roles throughout the 
reconstruction process, since it is indeed their own future that hangs in 
the balance.”29 A reconstruction process moves forward in stages, 
however, and, in the initial emergency response, international interveners 
will play the crucial role until local capacity is rebuilt.30 To facilitate the 
reconstruction process, CSIS strategy has been to advocate the 
deployment of “transitional justice packages”—conceptualized more 
broadly than simple model codes—to provide “justice and reconciliation” 
by addressing both immediate security needs and transitional justice 
issues.31 
All of these proposals recognize the need for specific measures to 
address the often contradictory requirements of speedy implementation, 
local participation (or at least local acceptance), and flexibility. Clearly, 
in the immediate post-crisis emergency period, security and stability 
remain tenuous, and, for this reason, long-term objectives need to be 
balanced against the short-term realities of the situation. Any initiative 
will need to take this into account and seek a pragmatic strategy. The 
proposals just outlined, however, though promising in many ways, have 
important conceptual limitations that restrict their potential 
effectiveness.32 These limitations derive from a primarily retrospective 
orientation, as well as the basic reliance of each on the paradigm of 
transitional justice, which leads to an overemphasis on criminal justice 
issues to the exclusion of civil matters. We believe that a successful post-
crisis justice initiative must move beyond the conceptual and political 
limitations inherent in the transitional justice paradigm. 
C. Emergency Justice vs. Transitional Justice 
One of the problems with post-crisis justice interventions is that the 
extraordinary nature of the crisis to which they respond tends to lead to 
an emphasis on the extraordinary problems arising from that crisis. In our 
 
28. Johanna Mendelson-Forman & Michael Pan, Discussion Paper, Post-Conflict Rapid 
Civilian Response 1 (2002) (on file with authors). 
29. CSIS, Task Framework, supra note 4, at 2. 
30. Id. at 2; Flournoy & Pan, supra note 7, at 113. 
31. CSIS, Task Framework, supra note 4, at 3, 8; Flournoy & Pan, supra note 7, at 113–14; 
Mendelson-Forman & Pan, supra note 28, at 2. 
32. An excellent critique of the literature on post-crisis rebuilding is RAMA MANI, BEYOND 
RETRIBUTION: SEEKING JUSTICE IN THE SHADOWS OF WAR (2002) (especially ch. 3). 




opinion, a successful initiative needs to look beyond the conceptual limits 
of criminal and transitional justice in order to approach rebuilding 
globally, grabbling both with the ordinary, as well as the extraordinary. A 
normally functioning legal system deals with present, future, and past, 
and plays various roles simultaneously: justice can be coordinative, 
facilitative, aspirational, and distributive, as well as remedial and 
retributional.33 The teleology of a post-crisis justice model has an 
important influence on the shape the intervention will take, its acceptance 
by the local population, and how it will function in practice. An initiative 
premised on the need to correct past wrongs will look very different from 
one based on the demands of the present. Transitional justice is one way 
to conceptualize the rebuilding of a justice system, but it is not the only 
way, nor necessarily the best way, in many circumstances. 
In a sense, all justice is transitional in that it seeks to move from a 
situation of rupture to one of closure, regardless of whether it tries to 
achieve this through punishment, prohibition, reconciliation, 
coordination, compensation, or declaration. In the literature on post-crisis 
intervention, however, “transitional justice” has taken on a focused 
meaning, namely the use of justice mechanisms—ranging from domestic 
or international criminal law to truth and reconciliation commissions—to 
deal with the mess left over from a crisis.34 As Ruti Teitel, one of its 
foremost theorists, has defined it, transitional justice is “the conception of 
 
33. Cf. id. at 5–11 (outlining three interdependent definitions of justice: legal justice or the rule 
of law, rectificatory justice, and distributional justice). 
34. For theoretical discussions, see TEITEL, supra note 3, at 213–28; Aukerman, supra note 3, at 
44–47; Freeman, supra note 3, at 114–16; Martin Krygier, Transitional Questions About the Rule of 
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Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117 HARV. L. REV. 761 (2004); Ruti G. Teitel, 
Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE L.J. 2009, 
2011–15 (1997); Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 69–70 
(2003) [hereinafter Teitel, Genealogy]; Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice in a New Era, 26 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 893, 893–94 (2003) [hereinafter Teitel, New Era]; Ruti Teitel, The Law and 
Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 837 (2005). Among case 
studies on transitional justice, see generally Wendy S. Betts et al., The Post-Conflict Transitional 
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Law, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 371 (2001); Colm Campbell & Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Local Meets 
Global: Transitional Justice in Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 871 (2003); Laura A. 
Dickinson, Transitional Justice in Afghanistan: The Promise of Mixed Tribunals, 31 DENV. J. INT’L 
L. & POL’Y 23 (2002); Matthew Draper, Justice as a Building Block of Democracy in Transitional 
Societies: The Case of Indonesia, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 391 (2002); Aeyal M. Gross, The 
Constitution, Reconciliation, and Transitional Justice: Lessons from South Africa and Israel, 40 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 47 (2004); Fionnuala Ní Aoláin & Colm Campbell, The Paradox of Transition in 
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justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal 
responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor 
regimes.”35 
Transitional justice, in this view, is extraordinary justice adapted to the 
particular needs of extraordinary times of flux or tension, situations in 
which the usual rules (including the rule of law) cannot, or should not, 
apply. As Teitel argues (though this thesis has by no means been 
unchallenged36): 
Transitions imply paradigm shifts in the conception of justice; 
thus, law’s function is deeply and inherently paradoxical. In its 
ordinary social function, law provides order and stability, but in 
extraordinary periods of political upheaval, law maintains order 
even as it enables transformation. Accordingly, in transition, the 
ordinary intuitions and predicates about law simply do not apply. 
In dynamic periods of political flux, legal responses generate a sui 
generis paradigm of transformative law.37 
Law in such a situation becomes “hyper-politicized,”38 working as a 
political force to undermine the status quo (which tends to be complicit in 
the crisis) in order to help establish a new order. As Teitel puts it, “[w]hat 
emerges is a pragmatic balancing of ideal justice with political realism 
that instantiates a symbolic rule of law capable of constructing 
liberalizing change.”39 
Not all theorists of transitional justice would characterize its mission so 
expansively, of course,40 but the theme of “desperate times require 
desperate measures” runs through the transitional justice literature. The 
pervasive influence of the transitional justice model is such that proposals 
for emergency justice interventions tend to be conceptualized in its terms: 
that is, as extraordinary in nature and with an implicit teleology, namely 
the restoration (or creation, as the case may be) of democratic institutions 
and the rule of law. This has the effect of both overly narrowing and, at 
the same time, overly broadening the ambitions of such interventions: on 
the one hand, the focus on the extraordinary nature of the situation leads 
to a narrow overemphasis on security and high-profile criminal matters, 
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36. See Krygier, supra note 34, at 27–28; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 34. 
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38. Id. at 25. 
39. Id. at 213. 
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while, on the other hand, their implicit teleology leads to an idealistic 
rhetoric of democracy and justice that, in most cases, is so broad as to be 
hopelessly unrealistic in practice.41 
As already noted, however, there have been numerous critiques of this 
conceptualization of transitional justice as extraordinary, even 
revolutionary, justice. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, for example, 
argue against the extraordinary nature of transitional justice. They see 
regime changes as lying at the end of a broad continuum of transitions, 
and argue that regime changes should be analyzed in the context of the 
many minor and ordinary transitions that regularly occur within stable 
democracies.42 Erin Daly, for her part, rejects the implicit top-down 
nature of the transition paradigm, which she argues stands at odds with 
the fundamental goal of justice rebuilding, namely reconciliation. What is 
needed, she argues, is the transformation of post-crisis society, which 
implies a more organic process that implicates local elements in the 
rebuilding process.43 Finally, Thomas Carothers casts doubt on the entire 
teleology of the transitional justice paradigm. He argues that the 
assumption that transition necessarily must mean transition to democracy 
fails to take into account the empirical reality that the majority of states 
undergoing post-crisis transition stabilize in a gray area, which is neither 
dictatorship nor fledgling democracy. The danger in positing Western-
style democracy as the only acceptable endpoint is conceptual 
oversimplification, which can lead to failure: “The continued use of the 
transition paradigm constitutes a dangerous habit of trying to impose a 
simplistic and often incorrect conceptual order on an empirical tableau of 
considerable complexity.”44 
Behind the critiques of transitional justice are not just differences of 
terminology or implementation, but rather a fundamentally different view 
of the rule of law and its role in reconstruction. One of the crucial 
questions is thus exactly to what the transition is leading. As Teitel points 
out, transition is a normative process, which posits a particular endpoint 
(generally a functioning democracy) and shapes responses so as to 
achieve it.45 This, of course, brings up issues of cultural difference, even 
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colonialism, that we discuss below. Here, it is important to note that 
interventions conceptualized along the lines of transitional justice will 
have very different objectives (and, consequently, a very different 
orientation) than those conceptualized in other ways. Martin Krygier 
grasps this difference when he argues that moving from viewing the rule 
of law in static terms as a recipe for democracy to seeing it in dynamic 
terms as a value or a process is a crucial first step in designing a 
reconstruction process that includes and empowers local actors.46 For 
Krygier, the crucial time frame is the present, which he views as “not 
simply an empty but active space between past and future.”47 
In other words, justice building is much more complicated than simply 
inscribing the values of democracy and the rule of law on a tabula rasa: it 
requires a value-laden negotiation with and within the local community. 
The crucial point is that, while the terms and procedure of this negotiation 
can be determined in advance, its result cannot be. Justice in the post-crisis 
context is thus more of a procedural than a substantive issue:48 the 
interveners’ task is to set up a framework of institutions within which 
rebuilding will take place, not to present local actors with a goal and lead 
them to it step-by-step. Conceptualizing the problem as process rather than 
product in this way shifts attention away from grievance (the past) or 
teleology (the future) towards the specific present needs of identifiable 
individuals. Though international intervention is necessary to provide 
guidance, this guidance must always take the form of dialogue rather than 
lecture. 
The front-line justice system seeks to build on the insights and 
experience of these proposals and initiatives. In particular, we propose 
ways to step away from the limitations of a primarily retrospective view 
of the role of law in post-crisis reconstruction. As an emergency justice 
proposal—a concept broader than transitional justice—front-line justice 
envisages a more broadly conceived initiative that concentrates on the 
present (though its influence extends back into the past, as well as 
forward into the future). While transitional justice aims at establishing or 
reinforcing the rule of law by dealing with the mess left over from the 
previous regime, front-line justice aims rather at restoring a functional 
present-day justice system that will deal not only with justice problems at 
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the level of society as a whole (human rights abuses, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, lustration, and so on), but also with the ordinary 
problems of justice on an individual level that arise because of, or in spite 
of, crisis. People’s lives and their legal conflicts do not cease during 
conflict; justice rebuilding must deal both with issues raised by the crisis 
and with everyday issues that continue to arise despite the existence of 
the crisis. 
II. THE FRONT-LINE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
The system of front-line justice proposed here grows out of these 
previous proposals and the concerns they raise, but focuses on different 
issues and objectives. As we have seen, in international interventions of 
this kind, the ends envisaged play an important role in the ultimate 
chances of success or failure of the plan. Overly ambitious aims—often 
couched in terms of establishing democracy or instituting the rule of 
law—are laudable but hardly realistic in a society shattered by 
humanitarian crisis, endemic corruption, and recrimination. The immediate 
goal of front-line justice is more modest: to restore the basics of a 
functioning and just legal system as rapidly as possible, but in such a way 
as to build organically on indigenous institutions and values, rather than 
replacing them—a sort of step-by-step judicial restorative process. A 
successful application of the front-line justice system will, we believe, have 
longer-term effects, such as fostering security and providing a foundation 
for stabilizing and strengthening the rule of law. These broader goals are 
best achieved, however, by first creating a stable and just environment for 
rebuilding to take place, rather than by intervening with a complex, and 
often foreign, rule-of-law program specifically and explicitly designed to 
bring about a lasting Western-style liberal democracy. In short, it is our 
opinion that a limited, focused, and realistic short-term program can, if 
carefully planned, have important long-term effects. 
Limiting and focusing the ends of an intervention does not, however, 
mean limiting the scope or substance of the proposal. Conceptualizing the 
task of an intervention too narrowly will be just as fatal to its success as 
conceptualizing it too broadly. Front-line justice looks beyond issues of 
immediate short-term security, and, consequently, is not limited to 
criminal justice. Moreover, front-line justice is not a transitional justice 
program, and so is not just retrospective and not merely envisaged for 
extraordinary issues. Security is clearly important: without an end to 
lawlessness, moving forward is impossible. However, the purpose of 





post-crisis intervention cannot be limited to restoration of security and 
retrospective settling of problems that arose during the crisis. This has the 
effect of tying the initiative to the past, and thereby linking it to the same 
ways of thinking that resulted in the crisis in the first place. 
Front-line justice takes as its point of departure the observation that 
legal conflicts of all kinds continue to arise during, and immediately after, 
times of crisis. An intervention must look both to settling past injustices 
and to re-establishing legal normalcy, or else risk becoming lost in the 
retribution of the past. Normalcy means not just dealing with the 
extraordinary, but also restoring a system that will deal with the ordinary 
as well. While recognizing the need for accountability and closure 
regarding the past, we believe that the immediate post-crisis period also 
urgently requires justice strategies and institutions that can be deployed as 
one of the tools to help stabilize and normalize post-crisis society, in 
order to get people to see justice as a normal part of their lives. Front-line 
justice is thus distinct from transitional justice, but is at the same time 
distinct from the humanitarian interventions designed to meet the 
immediate subsistence, medical, and social needs of those whose lives 
and livelihoods have been catastrophically altered by the crisis. It 
operates alongside both international criminal tribunals and international 
humanitarian relief agencies; it does not aim to do everything, but rather 
to do a particular thing—rebuilding the justice system—well. 
Reconstructing a society ravaged by crisis is a huge undertaking that 
involves interventions and local initiatives in many different sectors at the 
same time: government, the economy, culture, social institutions, as well 
as the law. Rebuilding a justice system both affects, and benefits from, 
successes in other areas; in all these sectors, it is crucial that the ordinary 
and the extraordinary be dealt with together. 
Front-line justice comprises three distinct, yet complementary, parts: 
informational justice, safeguard justice, and mediational justice. All will 
be housed in the same justice shelter, where citizens can seek immediate 
measures to deal with the urgent justice needs within each local 
community. Figure 1 depicts the system graphically.  






Like an emergency medical outpost, each justice shelter will be a large, 
visible, and centrally located tent, which can be put up overnight and, if 
need be, taken down and moved just as quickly. The justice shelters 
represent the immediate emergency response to a post-crisis situation: a 
kind of judicial Red Cross, their work should be done within about two 
years. The three parts of the front-line justice system operate in harmony: 
their respective roles are different, though complementary, and together 
they provide communities with a full range of essential legal services. In 
the earliest emergency phase of an initiative, safeguard justice and 
informational justice will dominate the legal system. As the situation 
stabilizes, however, mediational justice will play an increasingly larger 
role, while informational justice will remain the point of entry for citizens 
seeking legal help. It should be noted as well that front-line justice works 
alongside whatever broader criminal justice initiatives (like international 





criminal or human rights tribunals) are in place, so that any war crimes or 
human rights violations uncovered by the front-line justice system would 
be referred to the proper authorities. 
A crisis stretches and tears the fabric not just of the state, but also of 
local communities, neighborhoods, and households. Problems arise at 
each of these levels, but international responses tend to be clustered at the 
state and regional level. The justice shelters of the front-line justice 
system aim primarily at the neighborhood and household level, the 
grassroots of disorder that are, simultaneously, the grassroots of hope. 
The point is to create institutions that require minimum resources, that are 
owned and run by local communities so that they can begin collectively 
resolving their conflicts and rebuilding their system of justice.49 The 
following specifics indicate the scope of the mandate of the front-line 
justice system more clearly. 
A. Informational Justice 
Upon entering a justice shelter, the citizen seeking justice will be met 
by a trained jurist, who will triage the situation and determine what 
recourse is appropriate. This is not simply a welcome desk, however, and 
the people staffing this area are not simply receptionists. Rather, the 
informational justice area is the initial point of entry into the front-line 
justice system and is equipped to provide quick help for many problems. 
The jurists—they might be lawyers, legal advisors, even notaries, 
depending on the local terminology—will first perform triage on the 
matters brought before them. Situations of crisis bring in their wake many 
different kinds of problems of a legal nature, which require different 
kinds of institutions to address them. Of the myriad legal issues that 
might be brought to the justice shelters, three broad categories are 
apparent. First, there are the problems directly deriving from the crisis 
itself, such as mass killings or sexual abuses, torture, and forced 
expulsion of individuals or expropriation of their property. Where these 
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primarily represent problems of domestic or international criminal or 
humanitarian law—the traditional domain of transitional justice—they 
will be beyond the competence of a justice shelter, and so the triage jurist 
will refer these matters to whatever centralized authorities are set up to 
deal with questions of transitional justice, such as international criminal 
tribunals. Where such cases primarily engage local matters, however, 
such as property questions, a justice shelter could appropriately render 
justice. 
Second, there are the problems that derive indirectly from the crisis, as 
when the breakdown of civil society leads certain elements within the 
community to use the crisis, or the subsequent continuing disorder, as an 
opportunity for lawbreaking of various kinds. These are, by contrast, 
clearly within the mandate of the front-line justice system. Since such 
activity would rarely be of a scope that would engage international 
norms, it makes sense to deal with these problems locally, rather than 
centrally. Local treatment also has the added benefit of removing a 
substantial volume of cases from the already taxed international or central 
tribunals. 
Finally, there are the ordinary justice problems that continue to arise 
despite the crisis, but whose resolution is impractical or impossible due to 
the ineffectiveness or destruction of justice institutions. These will, 
generally, be the largest number of cases and will include domestic 
matters, civil matters, neighborhood conflicts, criminal offenses 
(excepting those engaging war crimes or other international norms), and 
administrative matters. These cases would ordinarily be handled by civil 
courts or mediation programs. In the absence of such recourses, however, 
justice shelters are perfectly situated to handle these sorts of cases. 
Moreover, speedy and effective handling of these comparatively simple 
matters will help build the foundation of trust and confidence necessary 
to begin to restore legitimacy to the justice system. 
For the matters within the mandate of the front-line justice system, the 
triage jurist will proceed to identify those that are most urgent and that 
require immediate protective measures or safeguard orders; those that are 
less pressing and that would be amenable to mediation; and those that 
simply require legal information or specific and focused legal advice. The 
first two categories will be assigned to the safeguard justice and 
mediational justice areas, respectively; the third category will be dealt 
with in the informational justice area. 
Aside from this triage role, the jurists in the informational justice area 
will serve as general community legal resource personnel. Informational 





justice will thus resemble the maisons de justice et du droit found in 
France,50 the maisons de justice in Quebec City, Canada,51 or, perhaps, the 
legal aid clinics found in the United States. The jurists will be able to 
provide citizens with summary evaluation of legal situations, as well as 
basic advice on their rights and obligations, such as property transfers, 
contract interpretation, help with the formalities relating to births and 
deaths, and the like. In practice, this may in many cases turn out to be the 
bulk of the work of the front-line justice system; each situation will be 
distinct, and front-line justice can adapt to meet the needs of the society 
in question. In any case, informational justice will provide both a crucial 
means of re-establishing a degree of normalcy in the administration of 
justice, and a bridge linking the emergency phase of a justice intervention 
with the permanent institutions toward which the intervention is working. 
B. Safeguard Justice 
In the first few days and weeks post-crisis, immediate, critical justice 
measures are needed to safeguard and protect the lives and property of the 
vulnerable. Ensuring that the situation does not deteriorate is, of course, 
an aspect of post-conflict security, but to conceptualize it strictly as a 
policing issue is to miss its importance. Beginning the process of justice 
rebuilding requires more than mere absence of want and threats, though 
both are fundamental. Restoring justice institutions, and public 
confidence in them, also requires immediate positive steps to correct 
severe problems quickly and decisively. 
To this end, each justice shelter will include a safeguard justice area, in 
which a judge will exercise whatever summary or emergency jurisdiction 
local law provides. Of necessity, safeguard justice must be summary: the 
fragile state of justice requires severe measures. This might include 
habeas corpus, interim release, injunctions, and the like. The référé 
regime that exists in France and in other systems that follow the French 
model provides one example of such summary emergency proceedings,52 
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and another can be found in the system of safeguard orders in the 
Canadian province of Quebec.53 The essential characteristic of safeguard 
justice is that the orders will be issued rapidly, will be valid for a short 
period of time (but renewable), and will be immediately executory. For 
this last reason, it is crucial that the justice shelters be supported by local 
law enforcement officials specifically assigned to and trained for this 
role, to allow execution of safeguard orders or judgments rendered on 
provisional matters. Experience has shown that, even in situations where 
law and order has broken down completely, there always remain some 
individuals who can be relied upon to help with enforcement. 
The safeguard judges will, wherever possible, be domestic judicial 
actors experienced in local law: district or county judges, magistrates, 
justices of the peace, whoever has the required jurisdiction or capacity in 
the place in question and for the matter at issue. Front-line justice aims at 
community empowerment, so it is essential that justice be done by 
domestic actors, with international supervision to avoid corruption, 
cronyism, or replication of a discredited regime. Only in the most unusual 
circumstances—in societies emerging from sudden genocide, for 
example—will it be impossible to rely on local officials. 
Safeguard justice represents the truly urgent aspect of emergency 
justice rebuilding. As order is restored, there will be less and less of a call 
for this aspect of the front-line justice system. Even in the earliest days, 
however, not all matters that must be dealt with will be of an urgency to 
warrant a safeguard order. For these matters—important, though not 
urgent—front-line justice includes a system of mediational justice. 
C. Mediational Justice 
The mediational justice area of the justice shelters will offer citizens a 
consensual, voluntary system of mediation as a powerful and effective 
tool to resolve a wide variety of legal conflicts. Its particular appeal is 
twofold: it is free of charge to the parties, and it offers the chance for 
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rapid resolution of their problem. The triage jurist will identify those 
cases amenable to mediation and will encourage the parties to avail 
themselves of this form of dispute resolution. Where possible, 
mediational justice should be described and explained in terms of 
traditional dispute-resolution mechanisms familiar to the local 
community: mediational justice is flexible, and can easily adopt local 
cultural traditions, so as not to evoke bewilderment or encounter 
culturally based resistance.54 
Mediational justice will be undertaken by local members of civil 
society who have credibility and who have been carefully trained in 
mediation techniques by international resource personnel. It is crucial that 
the system be operational at the very moment the judicial institutions of 
the country cease to play their role: this allows a quick restoration of a 
functioning system to deal with the ordinary justice needs of the 
populace. To facilitate this, training will be based on the intensive 
methods already tested and perfected in the context of the Quebec judicial 
mediation program. By using an already available training model, 
implementation of an effective mediational justice program will be 
greatly facilitated and start-up time reduced.55 Depending on the 
availability of suitable personnel, mediations may also be conducted by 
suitably trained judges, magistrates, or justices of the peace. The ultimate 
goal is to establish an effective system of judicial mediation that will 
continue to operate after the front-line justice phase has ended. 
The parties consenting to mediational justice will meet with the 
mediator in order to work out an immediate solution to their problem. 
Flexibility is the key: the parties control the process, and any settlement 
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reached is up to them—the mediator is trained to facilitate negotiation 
and to keep the process on track, not to impose a solution. Generally, a 
single session of three to four hours will suffice to resolve the majority of 
disputes, though more complex matters (such as those implicating the 
community more broadly or involving several parties engaged in 
overlapping disputes) can take longer. 
Mediational justice is thus a rapidly deployable means of restoring a 
functioning system of ordinary justice, through which local communities 
can have their justice needs met. Its benefits are also long term, however, 
and continue long after the emergency response phase of justice 
rebuilding has ended. By establishing alternative modes of dispute 
resolution at the outset, the state equips itself with a powerful tool that 
can serve as the core of permanent locally controlled justice institutions 
based on the informational justice, and especially the mediational justice, 
components of the front-line justice system. 
In the long term, mediational justice can adapt and take various forms 
depending on the resources and needs of the society in question, changing 
form as the justice system is rebuilt. Initially, as part of the justice 
shelters, mediational justice is locally oriented, with mediators coming 
from the communities in question and serving the justice needs of the 
local population. This serves to continue the foundation-building essential 
to nurturing the rule of law by focusing energies at the local level, where 
acceptance and legitimacy are strongest. Eventually, as confidence in the 
ideal of the rule of law increases, and as a formal adjudicative justice 
system is rebuilt, a system of judicial mediation can be integrated into it. 
This brings to the centralized court system some of the strengths and 
legitimacy of the locally based initiatives, while maintaining the 
flexibility and links to indigenous forms of dispute resolution 
characteristic of the front-line justice system.56 
A mediation-based system has a variety of strengths that make it a 
particularly useful tool in post-crisis rebuilding. First, it is relatively more 
flexible and less procedurally intensive than adjudication. This allows it 
to avoid a major sticking point of the various proposals involving “justice 
packages,” all of which are based primarily on an adjudicative model: 
namely, the delay in establishing, understanding, and applying the 
domestic law of the country in question.57 Delay is the enemy of 
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rebuilding. Since mediation is based, where possible, on indigenous 
modes of dispute resolution, start-up times are shorter, as locals familiar 
with these traditions, rather than imported jurists, will be used.58 
Similarly, since mediation is substance- rather than procedure-intensive, 
it moves more quickly than adjudication, and so makes more efficient use 
of scarce judicial resources. 
Second, since the underlying model of justice in mediation is based on 
cooperation and reconciliation, rather than adversarial competition, it 
tends to mesh better with the indigenous dispute-resolution mechanisms 
found in many non-Western societies.59 As Jeremy Sarkin and Erin Daly 
write about Africa: 
The notion of reconciliation has been a part of African systems of 
dispute resolution for centuries. In these traditions, the restoration 
of balance, rather than punishment of the guilty, is the main focus 
of law enforcement. The group, not the individual, has been the 
traditional unit of African society. Consequently, legal 
proceedings are community affairs in which a central aim is to 
reconcile the disputing parties, to restore harmonious relationships 
within the community, and to compensate the victims. Mediation 
of conflicts within the community aims at reconciliation instead of 
punishment. These proceedings focus more on the relationship 
between the parties than the actual event complained of because 
the underlying objective is to restore harmony within the 
community.60 
Moreover, by recasting dispute resolution in win-win terms rather than 
as a winner-take-all competition, mediation moves away from the 
adversarial mindset that generates and characterizes crisis. 
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Third, because of its participatory and cooperative nature, mediation 
can perform an important pedagogical function that is largely missing in a 
system based only on adjudication. The lessons learned in adjudication 
tend mainly to be limited to deterrence, which, in cases where it works at 
all, teaches the wrongdoer little more than that certain actions are 
punished, and so should be avoided. Mediation works differently. 
Because the disputants participate directly in the negotiation and 
resolution of their conflict, they take from the experience a first-hand 
lesson in conflict-resolution skills. This introduces a forward-looking, 
preventative element to a justice system, since the lessons learned in the 
process of mediation turn it into a kind of self-help tool for the resolution 
of future disputes. 
Though mediation clearly has many advantages as a way to orient a 
justice-rebuilding initiative, not all conflicts are amenable to mediation, 
just as the justice shelters will not be equipped to deal with every matter 
that might come before them. Disputes involving violence (whether 
criminal or domestic), clear power imbalances between the parties, and 
the like, should generally be referred to adjudicative tribunals for 
resolution. Mediators must, therefore, work in tandem with other 
institutions of justice—both national and international—so as to create a 
gapless dispute-resolution system. 
Mediational justice thus plays a distinct and essential role in long-term 
post-conflict justice rebuilding. It serves the interests of efficiency by 
maximizing conflict resolution capacity, it fosters acceptance of judicial 
rebuilding by minimizing the resistance that inevitably goes with an 
imposed and foreign justice system, and it promotes sustainability by 
making local communities stakeholders in the project. 
 
* * * 
Local control and community participation are the key features of the 
front-line justice system, with international interveners playing a resource 
or supervisory role, rather than a controlling one. Local control fosters 
acceptance, permits fine-tuning to the needs of the community, and 
ensures a measure of cultural applicability and sensitivity that might 
otherwise be lacking. Local actors know the situation, know the people, 
and often know many of the stories behind the problems. International 
supervision is desirable, however, both to ensure compliance with 
international norms of human rights, fair treatment, and the like, and also 
to prevent the situation from degenerating into biased retribution or 
vendetta. Moreover, the presence of international interveners contributes 





strength to the initiative, since it shows the local community that the 
world is watching. Presence is crucial: the international community is 
there not to impose its will upon the locals, but to work with local 
personnel as supportive partners, providing resources, training, and 
consultative expertise, while leaving the running of the front-line justice 
system to the locals. The goal is a synergy, with each contributing 
strengths the other cannot: the locals supply legal and cultural knowledge, 
expertise in local traditions of dispute resolution, familiarity with the 
community, and legitimacy; the international interveners supply breadth 
of experience, general legal knowledge, expertise in international and 
humanitarian norms, as well as an evaluative distance allowing non-
biased assessment and implementation. The issue is really one of 
empowerment: the international community intervenes so as to give the 
local community the means to work through the reconstruction process 
itself. 
As embodiments of the local community, and thus privy to its stories 
and its testimony, the justice shelters of the front-line justice system are 
best placed to begin addressing both the extraordinary and the ordinary 
justice needs of the populace and so to begin the process of rebuilding the 
rule of law from the bottom up. A sense of unaccountability and 
hopelessness regarding any aspect of the justice system can lead to a 
worsening of disorder and subsequent problems of stability and 
legitimacy for a permanent legal order. The front-line justice system 
provides an initial measure to begin the rebuilding process, combining 
rapidity of deployment, flexibility, and public participation to create a 
climate of order and accountability that sends the message that the 
situation is under control at the local level. 
III. ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED IN FRONT-LINE JUSTICE 
Numerous issues arise in conceptualizing any post-crisis justice 
intervention, and the answers reached have strong bearing on the scope of 
the intervention and how it proceeds.61 Three issues in particular—goals 
and values, juridical considerations, and cultural considerations—
represent central and fundamental concerns that often pull in competing 
directions. All three interact and complement one another: goals, for 
example, depend on the cultural milieu in question, and the cultural 
context strongly affects the range of juridical considerations that is in 
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play. Analyzing front-line justice in the light of these concerns helps to 
underscore its unique potential to contribute to justice rebuilding. 
A. Goals and Values 
The overarching question in any intervention is the goals to which it is 
directed and the values it embodies. Casting an intervention in terms of 
reconciliation, for example, will lead to a different experience than 
casting it in terms of reconstruction; an intervention that seeks restoration 
of the rule of law as a pillar of democracy will proceed differently from 
one that works towards the rule of law as a way to achieve sustainable 
peace. 
Perhaps the most frequent justification for post-crisis justice 
interventions is that they will lead to the re-establishment of the “rule of 
law.”62 The term is variously defined, but a common theme is 
accountability: fostering the rule of law means aiding in the development 
of “independent and effective judicial systems that can force officials to 
act within their legal authority.”63 The rule of law thus plays a part in state 
reconstruction more generally, as a kind of shorthand expression of the 
justice ideals characteristic of a successful state, but defining it in such 
broad terms begs the questions of exactly which particular ideals the rule 
of law is to be understood as serving, and how these ideals are to be 
translated into practice.64 Commentators have rightly criticized the 
fuzziness of what Erik Jensen has termed “thick” definitions of the rule of 
law,65 which tend to view it as a panacea or “an elixir for countries in 
transition.”66 A better way to look at the rule of law in a post-crisis 
context is to shift its emphasis from the national to the local level.67 
Casting reconstruction in this way puts the emphasis on establishing 
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functioning, supported, and impartial legal institutions at the local level, 
which can see to the immediate justice needs of the population, and 
which can provide a foundation for further development once peace is 
more firmly established. Seen in this way, the rule of law becomes less a 
goal in its own right than a set of values—impartiality, accessibility, 
flexibility, accountability—around which to organize a justice system.68 
In the context of a post-crisis initiative, an ultimate goal of establishing 
the rule of law writ large is too distant to serve as a serious guide for an 
intervention. A short-term strategy of designing institutions like justice 
shelters that embody values relating to the rule of law is both realistic and 
essential to bringing about stable and sustainable reconstruction. 
The same criticism about the attainability of ideals applies to another 
frequently espoused goal for post-crisis interventions: namely, political 
transformation and the establishment of democracy.69 As we explain 
below, cultural factors often strongly limit the potential for success of any 
implantation of Western democratic ideals in places where they have little 
or no history. But, on a purely practical level, designing a working 
intervention strategy with such a broad and, frankly, vague goal is a 
daunting task, and one that has rarely been accomplished, if recent 
interventions are any guide.70 Transition to a democratically elected, 
stable and accountable government is, of course, desirable; the problem is 
that this is seldom realistic as a primary goal, since a great deal of other 
more fundamental work must be done first. 
Restoring justice to a shattered society requires more focused goals 
that relate to the needs of people, rather than populations.71 As we have 
argued already, for a society emerging from crisis the operative unit for 
rebuilding should be the community—perhaps even the neighborhood—
rather than the state. Rebuilding is a bottom-up process: long-term 
success or failure depends on what happens locally, particularly in places 
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where central authorities are non-existent or discredited. Three goals 
frequently addressed in the literature on post-crisis reconstruction speak 
specifically to this view of rebuilding: reconstruction, reconciliation, and 
protection of minorities. They should be seen as complementary aspects 
of any post-crisis initiative, rather than either-or options, as each 
contributes in distinct ways to building the foundation of a working 
justice system. 
Reconstruction involves not just rebuilding physical infrastructure 
(although the importance of this should not be underestimated),72 but also 
restoring the political, legal, and social environment that will foster the 
growth of civil society.73 As such, reconstruction can serve as an 
overarching and comprehensive goal for post-crisis rebuilding, but the 
ideal to which it speaks can also help orient the local initiatives. 
Reconstruction begins with the premise of destruction; its success 
depends on a frank and thorough assessment of the state of affairs. For 
this reason, reconstruction is naturally aimed at the local scene. Though 
frequently a nation is being reconstructed, rebuilding is the sum of local 
initiatives, and overall success depends on success at the local level. Of 
course, reconstruction in the justice context presupposes that there was 
something there to begin with that is worth salvaging and that can be built 
on. In many cases, rebuilding requires discarding the old and starting 
afresh with a new orientation. In such cases, there is a danger of a kind of 
ideological imperialism,74 in which rebuilding is taken as an opportunity 
to impose foreign institutions and ideals, a subject to which we return 
 
72. See the assessment of the situation in Rwanda and Sierra Leone in Chris Mburu, Challenges 
Facing Legal and Judicial Reform in Post-Conflict Environments: Case Study from Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone (2001) (working paper) (on file with authors): 
The judiciary was one of the institutions that suffered the greatest destruction during the 
conflicts in Rwanda and Sierra Leone. Apart from the decimation of most qualified judges 
and magistrates due to the genocide, the judiciary in Rwanda suffered the physical 
destruction of its infrastructure and came out of the genocide period in need of a complete 
overhaul. Courthouses were destroyed, vital legal documents and case files were either 
looted or burned down together with the buildings. Magistrates’ and judges’ houses were 
destroyed and their vehicles plundered or stolen. As a result, one of the first priorities for 
the new government, apart from training a new crop of judges and magistrates, was to find 
ways of assisting what was left of the judiciary to get the very basic materials it needed to 
begin operating modestly. 
73. See CSIS, Task Framework, supra note 4 (especially the four-part program: security, justice 
and reconciliation, social and economic well-being, and governance and participation). See also 
Hamre & Sullivan, supra note 4. 
74. See Kreilkamp, supra note 4. 





below. This underscores again how crucial it is to engage local 
communities in the reconstruction process. 
Reconstruction as a guiding value places the emphasis on context: the 
institutions and structures necessary to restore order and civil society. 
Reconciliation, by contrast, approaches post-crisis rebuilding differently, 
by seeking to build relationships between people and so to mend the 
fabric of society.75 As Wendy Lambourne writes, “rather than focusing on 
the political and legal aspects of peace agreements, truth commissions 
and criminal tribunals, we need to focus on the task of relationship-
building and how that may be enhanced through these various 
processes.”76 If reconstruction is a facilitative approach, conceived to 
restore the capacity for peace and the rule of law, reconciliation is 
restorative, conceived as “the coming together of things that once were 
united but have been torn asunder—a return to or recreation of the status 
quo ante, whether real or imagined.”77 This suggests, as Jeremy Sarkin 
and Erin Daly point out,78 that reconciliation is better seen as a process 
rather than as a goal; it describes the thousands of individual acts and 
incremental changes in outlook that must take place for rebuilding to 
occur. In some ways, this ideal of reconciliation, which looks towards 
forgiveness, might be seen to be in tension with justice, which tends to 
look towards punishment or accountability.79 Justice too, however, can be 
seen as a process rather than a goal, which brings the two ideals into 
alignment as two aspects of the reorientation that must occur before 
successful rebuilding can take place. 
Another value discussed in the literature on justice rebuilding, and one 
that pulls in a somewhat different direction than reconciliation and 
reconstruction, is the protection of minorities, rather than their forced 
assimilation or expulsion.80 In the context of justice rebuilding, 
institutions set up in the short term and objectives sought in the long term 
need to address this concern, or else the society runs the risk of 
replicating its crisis because of the continued existence of tensions or 
hostilities within it. Likewise, a society that oppresses its minorities 
cannot be said to be just: the justice system in place needs to look out for 
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its most vulnerable members, both in terms of safeguarding their interests 
during the tense early days of rebuilding and in terms of designing 
institutions that neither explicitly nor systemically exclude certain 
elements of the population, such as ethnic or religious minorities, women, 
children, the elderly, or the disabled. This can, of course, lead to conflicts 
between the competing values of self-determination and inclusiveness; 
we explore this question in Section III.C below. 
Finally, it is worth noting one further goal that lurks behind all of the 
others, serving as both a prerequisite and an end in itself: sustainable 
peace.81 Sustainability is both the most crucial and the most difficult 
challenge in peace building. It includes an institutional component, such 
as setting up conflict management resources, like courts, mediation 
programs, and the like, but this is not all. It also includes a mental 
element of confidence in the system and recognition of the importance of 
settling conflicts via the rule of law, rather than by hostility or extra-legal 
means. Part of this mental element is learning that conflict is not 
necessarily bad: some measure of conflict (of certain kinds, to be sure) is 
both inevitable and beneficial in a healthy and well-functioning society.82 
Sustainable peace cannot be achieved by suppressing conflict, which 
quickly leads to repression of dissent, which gives way to increasingly 
acrimonious grievance. What is needed is the translation into practice of 
this distinction between healthy and unhealthy conflict, between the 
peaceful disagreements of healthy civil society and the rancorous self-
interested grasping of an impending crisis. On the level of justice 
rebuilding, this means designing conflict-resolution institutions in order 
to keep conflict within manageable proportions and channeled towards 
constructive, rather than destructive, ends. 
B. Juridical Considerations 
Translating the general goals for a post-crisis justice-rebuilding 
initiative into a concrete intervention strategy poses a number of specific 
challenges from a legal point of view. Chief among these is 
distinguishing between projects that are possible and those that are too 
foreign for acceptance. This involves walking a number of fine lines: 
between desirable flexibility and undesirable vacillation or uncertainty, 
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between empowerment and supervision, between the pragmatic justice 
needs of local communities and the broader plans of the international 
community. A balance is crucial to prevent replication of the crisis 
situation and to promote sustainable development of a justice system. 
Considerable attention has been given in the literature on 
reconstructive justice to the issue of applicable law.83 Clearly, one of the 
principal challenges facing an emergency justice intervention is to 
establish precisely what body of law will be applied by whatever justice 
institutions are set up. Proposals based on “justice packages” and model 
codes, which, as we have seen, concentrate mainly on criminal justice, 
tend to rely most heavily on international law, since its claim is to be 
sufficiently universal as to be transportable anywhere.84 Mark Plunkett, 
for example, notes that a U.N. “off-the-shelf” criminal code might draw 
its substance from such international instruments as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and the Basic Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary.85 For civil matters, interveners might similarly apply a skeleton 
of essential principles and procedures drawn from international initiatives 
such as the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil 
Procedure.86 
Leaving aside, for the moment, the general issue of the acceptability of 
the choice to import a body of law, rather than to apply local law, it 
should be noted that the importance of the problem of applicable law 
depends on how an intervention is characterized. Where justice rebuilding 
is based on an adjudicative model, determination of the applicable law 
will be a central problem. As we have seen, the massive criminal justice 
needs in post-crisis situations tend to impose an adjudicative model on 
potential interventions, which, in turn, suggests the need for model 
criminal codes to ensure fundamental justice and efficiency alike. While 
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an adjudicative model may be appropriate for the criminal law, for civil 
and administrative matters, a mediational model is more suitable, as we 
argued above. The strength of a mediational model is that it depends 
much less on the specifics of substantive or procedural law than does an 
adjudicative system. Within the limits of certain peremptory norms 
(international human rights, public order), the parties are free to explore 
creative and unorthodox solutions. Moving away from an adjudicative 
model thus effectively sidesteps much of the applicable law debate. 
Related to the applicable law issue is the problem of flexibility. A 
crucial element in any justice-rebuilding program is adaptability, as no 
one-size-fits-all intervention can do justice to the myriad legal problems 
and particularities in a post-crisis situation. As David Kahane notes, 
conceptualizing dispute resolution is a political process, which means that 
the interveners inevitably inscribe the resulting institutions and processes 
with a particular set of values.87 Care must, therefore, be taken that 
assumptions about Western ideas of law or justice—that these ideals are 
universal or neutral, for example—not become necessary prerequisites for 
a post-crisis justice system. This goes back to the point made above about 
goals: rebuilding must be an organic process, proceeding out from the 
needs and values of the local community, rather than shaping local 
experience to a preconceived set of goals. Flexibility, in short, means 
taking careful account of the cultural situation and existing practices of 
the society in question, a subject we address in the next Section. 
Finally, access to justice also presents significant challenges to a post-
crisis justice initiative.88 Planning an intervention requires recognition 
that certain systemic problems often predate a crisis: the pre-crisis justice 
system may itself not have been fully or adequately functioning. 
Moreover, it is in societies most at risk of crisis where access to justice 
problems are most acute, due to costs of justice, distance between justice 
institutions, or distrust and fear of authorities. Rebuilding initiatives can 
address this problem by keeping the focus on the local, rather than the 
national, scene. Human problems must be addressed on a human scale, 
with justice brought to the people. 
C. Cultural Considerations 
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Any intervention, however well-designed or well-intended, is a highly 
charged political act, with the inherent and inescapable danger of 
encountering resentment, resistance, and ultimately rejection. As David 
Kahane writes: 
While we cannot responsibly escape generalizing about cultural 
perspectives in understanding dispute resolution, such 
generalization takes place on a political terrain, and is itself a 
political act. So we need to see ourselves as engaged not in an 
effort to pinpoint the truth about cultures, but rather in a politics of 
cultural generalization when we theorize dispute resolution, or 
seek to intervene in disputes. The alternative is to ignore 
differences, and thereby to give implicit support to dominant 
cultures, which understand themselves as no culture, or every 
culture.89 
Furthermore, the lines of resistance that arise tend to crisscross, with 
the interests of local, regional, and national political authorities, religious 
and ethnic groups, and individuals all in complex and shifting states of 
tension with each other. Rebuilding a justice system thus requires a high 
degree of cultural sensitivity: to language, to indigenous attitudes towards 
law and dispute resolution, to local legal traditions and institutions, and to 
the role of religion and other values in law.90 Erin Daly calls this 
“contextuality”: the need to tailor solutions to the specific needs of the 
society emerging from crisis.91 Whether an intervention is understood in 
transformative or restorative terms, these cultural issues set up de facto 
boundaries within which interveners must work. To an extent, these 
boundaries are negotiable and can be shifted or shaped over the medium 
and long term. In the short term, however, it is important that those 
planning a justice-rebuilding initiative understand the local cultural 
constraints and not work in ignorance or, worse, defiance of them. 
The overarching issue is the risk that intervention will become a form 
of ideological imperialism or neo-colonialism. The danger here is that the 
need for immediate action will result in cultural impositions that will 
prove unacceptable to the local population and will have undesirable or 
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outright harmful effects in the long run.92 This is the dangerous side of the 
transition paradigm we critiqued above. The assumptions implicit in this 
model can easily suggest a value-laden transition from some benighted 
form of society to one based on Western ideals and institutions. It is 
important in post-crisis situations not to simplistically identify an entire 
culture with whatever abuses or shortcomings prevailed before or during 
the crisis. The job of a rebuilding initiative is not to modernize or 
Westernize, but to restore or implement culturally acceptable, workable, 
effective, and just legal institutions. Imposed or enforced justice 
rebuilding, when done without meaningful local consultation and 
participation, runs the risk not only of rejection, but also of perpetuating 
the very helplessness and injustices that the intervention is intended to 
remedy. 
The crucial defense against this legal imperialism—which amounts to a 
form of paternalism—is the use of local actors in the rebuilding process.93 
As we argued above, this most effectively marshals expertise and helps 
ensure a degree of local acceptance, provided that international 
supervision is present to guard against bias or self-interested action. It is 
important to stress, however, that local actors do not simply mean 
nationals of the country in question. The operative divisions will likely be 
finer than that, and in some cases interveners from elsewhere in the 
afflicted country may be just as foreign as international interveners. 
Cultural sensitivity thus involves paying careful attention to the fissures 
and fault lines within society, since in the short term they can be 
insurmountable obstacles to effective action. 
At the same time, however, certain ideals brought to a post-crisis 
situation by international interveners are by their nature non-negotiable 
limits that cannot be traded away in the name of cultural sensitivity or 
pragmatics. This applies, for example, to the human rights guarantees set 
out in international instruments, as well as prohibitions against war 
crimes, torture, and crimes against humanity. These core human values 
must be distinguished, however, from some of the ideals specific to 
liberal democracy that can appear (to those who live under them) to be 
neutral and universal, but that in fact enshrine the particular values of 
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Western culture. Western democratic and voting ideals, notions about the 
adversarial airing of disputes, and many of the social and economic 
values inscribed in Western law, for example, may well be foreign to the 
society in question and provoke either bewilderment or outright 
resistance. Thorny questions of definition can arise, however, in drawing 
the line between non-negotiable universal human rights and desirable, but 
controversial, ambitions. The case of gender equity and the empowerment 
of women is a good example, as Western ideals may be unacceptable in a 
society where traditional gender roles claim their origin in religious 
precepts.94 Justice rebuilding is a normative endeavor; as such, it comes 
into contact—or conflict—with other competing normative orders within 
the society. This necessitates delicate and sensitive balancing of value 
systems as an intervention stakes out a middle ground between the 
peremptory norms of international humanitarian law and the practical 
constraints of local culture. As Rama Mani writes: 
If ideas and institutions about as fundamental and personal a value 
as justice are imposed from the outside without an internal 
resonance, they may flounder, notwithstanding their assertions of 
universality. If these concepts are articulated internally, there must 
be some universal standard against which to evaluate them, to 
ensure that they do not entrench unjust principles or discriminate 
against weak groups under the guise of respect for traditional 
cultural values.95 
In the short term, performing this balancing act successfully requires 
careful evaluation of the structure of society as it emerges from crisis and 
the obstacles that this can present to the rebuilding process. 
Cultural considerations must be evaluated dynamically, since it is the 
social context at the time of the intervention that counts, not the way 
things were before the crisis began. Any society emerging from a crisis 
situation will present certain endemic constraints that severely limit what 
rebuilding initiatives are possible. Corruption, for example, is a 
particularly troublesome problem. Though often cast as a security issue,96 
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the importance of controlling corruption is actually much broader. On the 
one hand, corruption contributes to the paralysis of society and its 
institutions, tying the hands of local actors and international interveners 
alike. On the other hand, corruption—whether carried over from the pre-
crisis regime or newly arisen post-crisis—can tap into, and reinforce, 
endemic or traditional hostility to justice institutions, thus severely 
circumscribing the limits of what is possible. Such a situation argues 
strongly in favor of external intervention, but intervention of a kind that 
supports and empowers indigenous counterbalances to corruption, rather 
than paternalistic control. 
In a similar way, public confidence in law and its institutions is itself a 
cultural consideration that must be evaluated dynamically. A lack of 
public confidence in institutions of justice or in the rule of law more 
generally can be the result of a long-standing culture of submissiveness, 
but it can also grow out of the specific short-term political or social 
situation that prevailed and precipitated the crisis. In many ways, the 
main obstacle facing a rebuilding initiative is convincing people to go 
against their own perceptions of their short-term self-interest, and instead 
to trust an intervention. This problem is particularly acute in societies 
where there is no history of the rule of law, where the judiciary or the 
legal system was perceived to be complicit in the crisis, or where the 
sense that justice is an ideal that translates into practice is missing. This 
lack of public confidence can take many forms, ranging from fear of 
those in authority, to a prevailing preference for lawlessness or self-help, 
to simple inertia and reluctance to open old wounds. Moreover, it should 
not be forgotten that individual or highly localized fears and constraints 
are, perhaps, the most significant forces eroding public confidence in 
rebuilding. Examples include individuals who fear intimidation or 
violence towards themselves, their families, or their witnesses, poverty or 
desperation leading to the buying and selling of testimony regarding 
offences, and the like. Such situations present continuing and significant 
obstacles to access to justice and must be dealt with at the local level. 
Post-crisis situations create huge numbers of desperate people, and the 
long-term goal of collectively rebuilding civil society and the short-term 
demands of individual survival do not necessarily always mesh together. 
In designing and implementing a justice-rebuilding strategy, ideals are 
important, but, faced with near chaos, it is often difficult to justify the 
high road. Pragmatics or efficiency should not become justifications for 
paternalism, but, at the same time, idealism should not become a 





straitjacket preventing action. Striking the proper balance requires 
sensitivity and creativity. 
CONCLUSION 
If we return to our symbols of the citadel of justice and the justice 
shelter, the preceding discussion now allows us to see more clearly 
precisely how the front-line justice system, as outlined here, brings a 
fundamentally new perspective to justice rebuilding. Both the citadel and 
the shelter are central institutions, but their points of reference are 
different, and this is crucial. The citadel symbolizes the court as a 
centralized institution at the national level, designed and intended to rise 
above factions and divisions to unite the state under a single rule of law. 
As such, however, the citadel depends for its legitimacy and its 
effectiveness on a national culture of justice and the rule of law, 
something that is missing or defective in a post-crisis situation. The 
justice shelter, by contrast, is a local institution, designed to pragmatically 
restore justice at the neighborhood or community level, without (for the 
moment) any explicit grander ambitions that might prove to be 
unworkable in the long run. Its design and intention recognize the reality 
of a post-crisis situation, in which divisions and hostilities prevent 
consensus, and dictate a return to the local level, at least for the time 
being. Rebuilding on a national scale requires the foundation of rebuilt 
households, neighborhoods, and communities; the fabric of society is 
repaired piece by piece. The justice shelter is local in more than its 
location or jurisdiction, however: it reflects the community it serves in its 
composition, its personnel, its procedure, its orientation, and, most 
importantly, its values. As such, it abandons (temporarily at least) the 
central national institutions of justice in favor of justice centered on the 
community, because it recognizes that in the particular situation at issue 
broadly-based institutions are unworkable, untrustworthy, or unreachable 
by the local population. 
This shift from the national to the local—from the citadel of justice to 
the justice shelter—is the defining characteristic of front-line justice as an 
emergency justice intervention strategy. Its main strength in both the 
short term and the long term, however, is its reliance on mediation as the 
principal means of dispute resolution. Mediation provides the bridge 
between the short term and the long term, between the shelter and the 
citadel. By giving local actors a powerful tool with which to handle a 
wide range of both extraordinary and ordinary justice matters, front-line 




justice helps restore the stability and confidence needed for the further 
growth of a healthy legal system. 
 
